The Vietnam War was certainly a different kind of war for Australia. Unlike the two World Wars and, for the most part, Korea, there was no defining front line with a terrain of battle front and forward positions, and rear echelons in which to take respite from battle. In Phuoc Tuy Province, and across its closest borders with other Provinces, the enemy could be anyone. The Viet Cong wore civilian clothing and toiled their land, or went to school, while Australian troops patrolled around them.

Even before America and Australia sent their combat troops to Vietnam, the South Vietnam armies had more firepower and mobility than the Viet Cong, and the few Divisions of North Vietnams Army that had moved into the south. South Vietnam had complete control over the air. When America and its allies, including Australia, arrived this advantage in firepower, total air supremacy, and rapid mobile response, became an awesome array of weaponry.

However, to be effective against an enemy, the massive firepower available needed a large concentration of enemy forces and installations to unleash that firepower at. The tactics of the Viet Cong, learned since World War Two against the Japanese, and then against the French, was not to present large targets to their foes. It was Guerilla Warfare, and required efforts to remain undetected until they had a target or objective to attack, then as quickly, disperse into the cover of the jungle, hide in tunnels, or return to their village or farm, and carry out normal daily routines.

The United States Air-Force could direct at the Viet Cong more high explosives than had been possible in any previous war. There were B52 bombers which could drop 1000lb and 500lb bombs from 50,000ft with amazing accuracy. The explosion of each 1000lb bomb dug a crater 5 metres deep, and 10 metres round. There were fighter aircraft which could drop a few 500 or 1000lb bombs but with even greater accuracy, and which could also deliver an array of rockets and canon fire as well as canisters of flaming napalm. There were C3 transport aircraft fitted with a number of machine guns with very high rates of fire and loaded with an enormous amount of ammunition which could circle a designated area for hours, saturating it with small arms fire. There were special helicopters fitted with rockets and machine guns, commonly called 'Gunships', or, 'Huey'.

Australia had the support of this air strike capability at call. As well, there was Artillery on land, and the availability of 16 inch Naval Guns, that could fire in support of ground troops from many miles away. On land there were 8 inch guns, then an enormous number of 155mm medium artillery and 105mm field artillery as well as countless 80mm and 60mm mortars. Then there were the tanks which usually had the equivalent of a field gun. All these guns could be continually fired because wherever they were, they could be re-supplied by road convoys protected by armoured vehicles or, if necessary, they could be supplied by helicopter.

Australian ground forces carried an awesome arrangement of firepower whenever they went on operations. A typical 11 man section of a Platoon carried between them their own personal weapon, either an L1A1 SLR semi-automatic, or M16A1 Armalite rifle, 10 to 15 fully loaded 20 and 30 round magazines for the rifle, 1 or 2 100 round belts of the same ammunition, 4 to 6 M26 Hand Grenades, along with his rations. As well, the section shared between them 2 M60 Machine Guns, with the Gunner and his Second burdened with the additional weight of extra belts of Machine Gun ammunition - about 1000 rounds each; At least 2 section members carried a M79 Grenade Launcher and 36 rounds; another 2 carried 2 M72 LAW's - Anti-tank-weapon; and the section also would be carrying at least 10 M18 Claymore mines with them.

This amount of firepower was repeated for each of a Platoons 3 sections, 3 Platoons in each Company, and 4 Companies to each Battalion. Although a battalion's A Company was made up of its Headquarters and Administration, and Support Sections, and B, C and D Companies as Infantry Rifle Companies, or combat troops, it must be remembered that the ANZAC battalions had 1 extra Rifle Company of the New Zealand contingent. In any case, all members of a battalion had completed training to get them ready for Vietnam. Couple this with the support of Helicopters, Tanks and APC's, a Company or two attacking any enemy installation, such as a bunker system, could be expected to, and did so often, win on the day. Add to this the ability to call in Artillery or air strikes with impunity, and you have a very potent army ready to strike at anything the enemy put in its way.

On the other hand, and although well equipped with their own modern arms, like the Russian made Kalashnakov AK47 automatic rifle, and the RP67V Rocket Launcher, along with an assortment of high calibre rapid fire machine guns, mortars and hand grenades, the Viet Cong and North Vietnam Army units in the south could not resupply ground troops by air. Instead they relied upon supply routes over land, such as 'The Ho Chi Minh Trail' that ran just outside South Vietnam's border with Cambodia, and crossing into North Vietnam near its border with Laos. Sometimes they would risk a coastal drop by avoiding Naval patrols.

The differences in firepower led to the Viet Cong adopting certain military and political tactics and strategies including a certain type of warfare. It was known as Revolutionary Guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is a way of fighting an enemy who is superior in firepower and mobility. the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese troops had very little firepower at their disposal. With the US air-force in complete command of the skies, the use of convoys of trucks to transport artillery and to resupply them inside South Vietnam was very difficult. Such large scale resupply was restricted to the border areas of the north and west. Inside South Vietnam most of the ordinance resupply was done on foot.

With all its 1000lb bombs, napalm, artillery shells and other ordinance of mass destruction the Allies, to be destructive, needed a mass to destroy. That is, for all that Australian firepower to be effective there had to be targets such as large concentrations of troops, defended installations, vehicle convoys, concentrations of equipment and defended positions. The tactics of Guerrilla warfare is to avoid presenting such targets. Troops fighting a Guerrilla war do not hold ground so there is no piece of ground they consider it necessary to defend to the last man. When the Viet Cong were challenged on a piece of ground, they would fight with a view to a withdrawal and moving out.

Nor did the Viet Cong congregate for long in large concentrations. Instead they chose to disperse in small groups and live in environments like jungles where finding them is difficult. When they wanted to execute a military action such as an attack, they secretly concentrated near the objective, carried out the attack, then, before reinforcements could arrive, and before Artillery could be brought to bear on them, they withdrew and dispersed into the jungle. The Viet Cong found that nighttime military operations made them less vulnerable to Australia's superior firepower and mobility.

Another way to counteract being shelled and bombed was to get in close to troops so that it limited, or nullified, the possibility of artillery being used. The Viet Cong found that close in ambushes was an effective means to this end, and would attack a large base only to quickly disperse and ambush any reinforcements sent to protect the base. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese adhered closely to these Guerrilla tactics. They tried to choose the time and place for a battle and avoid battle at other times.

This type of warfare in South Vietnam meant that there were no front lines as there were in the 1st World War , the 2nd World War and Korea. Front lines only develop to protect ground, and because ground was not important to the Viet Cong, no front lines were defined. As there were no front lines, there were also no safe rear areas. An ambush might be sprung anywhere.

In the villages of South Vietnam there were those who preferred the Viet Cong's ideology, and who thought they would be better off under the Viet Cong's political system. These people were organized by cadres from the Viet Cong into groups. There were farmers groups, young peoples groups, women's groups and so on. This organization was known as the Viet Cong Infrastructure, or VCI, and carried out its business in secrecy. This part of their ideology was the 'Revolutionary' scheme of the Guerilla War.

The task of the VCI was to provide logistic support and intelligence to the Viet Cong military forces. Logistic support included food, money clothing and recruits. Intelligence often came from Viet Cong sympathisers, who worked in local headquarters of the South Vietnamese military forces, providing information about troop movements and operational intentions. And because the other lines of supply were so tenuous, the support of the VCI for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese military units was essential for their survival.

The lines of communication required that a local VCI member would report to a local Guerilla unit of about 20 men and women, who would pass on the information to a local force battalion of some 500 Viet Cong, and if thought warranted, a Regimental force of Viet Cong or North Vietnam Army unit would be advised of major movements or operations happening within a certain area.

One important element in the Viet Cong's guerrilla warfare was the widespread use of booby traps. Ingeniously contrived from readily available materials - sometimes from captured or recovered mines and ammunition - these unseen weapons were often made by members of the VCI as well as the Viet Cong themselves. So effective were they, that in some areas, they were said to account for up to 50 per cent of allied casualties.

The government of South Vietnam, and the French before them, had never had a strong grip on Phuoc Tuy Province. So the influence of the Viet Minh had been strong, a legacy bequeathed by the Viet Cong. The pattern of Guerrilla warfare in Phuoc Tuy Province was therefore long established, and one the Australians needed to break quickly.

The commanders of the Australian military force in Phuoc Tuy Province recognised two fundamental tasks. The first was to search out and destroy the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese military units operating in the Province. The second was to cut the vital link between the VCI in the villages and those military units. The cutting of that vital link, the commanders realised, would hurt the military units out in the jungle. But it would, in time, also hurt the credibility of the VCI and allow the agencies of the South Vietnamese government to win over the village people and farmers.

Intelligence gathered by a SAS patrol, or an intercepted radio message between a cadre and his unit, or from air surveillance, or via satellite, would be used by Australian Commanders to select an Area of Operations, (AO), for a Battalion to move in and seek out and destroy whatever the intelligence report denoted.

If the AO was outside of Artillery cover range, a Fire Support Base, (FSB), would be set up, and Artillery guns moved into the FSB so that the Battalion in the AO would have Artillery support if needed. Normally, the battalion would be flown in by helicopter to an area at least a days walk from their objective AO, to avoid detection by Viet Cong.

In some instances the search and destroy missions were successful in dislodging and destroying large Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units from bunker complexes and training camps built into the jungle. At other times the ambushing of suspect Viet Cong tracks and cache sites proved fruitful. Other platoon strength patrols with overnight ambushes were also carried out with some success. Gradually it became the Viet Cong and NVA who feared being ambushed in Phuoc Tuy Province.

For the most part, the Viet Cong and NVA Regiments in Phuoc Tuy Province failed to stay and fight Australians, except to leave a small expendable force behind to slow down the Australians so that the larger force could escape. However, there were times when for whatever reasons, military or political, they did chose to take the attack to Australians. These attacks included the battles for FSB's Coral and Balmoral, the Battle of Binh Bah, and the Battle of Long Tan. Australia won all its battles against the Viet Cong and NVA and even succeeded in forcing VC/NVA units to operate from outside the province.

In order to cut the VCI communications links with the VC, Australian troops were involved in locating and moving known pro-Viet Cong families, sometimes whole village populations, and hamlets into safe areas, where South Vietnamese Army and Police could make them non-functional. This also involved a program of trying to sway the population over to the South, and a self-help program to make their lives more meaningful.

The Australian Task Force destroyed villages in a difficult to control and pro-Viet Cong area called slope 30 and moved the inhabitants to a village built by the Australian Army Engineers called Ap Sui Nai. Also, hamlets were concentrated with outlying houses being relocated nearer the center. Then barbed wire fences were built around the hamlets leaving normal access by a limited number of gates. There were platoons of about 30 men raised in the villages to defend the integrity of these fences. Finally, there was a curfew enforced on all the rural population between last light (in the evening) and first light (in the morning). Between those times the people had to be inside the fences. Outside became a free fire zone.

Often, Australian troops would set night ambushes in areas of approaches to villages, and select, at random, certain villages for a Cordon and Search. This would involve a Company of Australians blocking off exits and entrances to villages while the South Vietnamese Army and Police, accompanied by an Aiustralian Platoon, carried out person checks and searches within the village. In a show of compassion aimed at winning over the villages, Australian Medics and Doctors would sometimes consult, inspect and treat the villagers, and a Field Kitchen would cook up a meal as well.

For whatever reason, and despite Australia's efforts, the South Vietnamese Government could not win over some of the villages, and the VCI remained intact in many areas. The South Vietnamese governments inability to win the ideological war in the villagers had many causes, including endemic corruption and failure to redistribute land, but despite the Australian's shield providing the opportunity for the South Vietnamese government agencies to counter them, the influence of the Viet Cong Infrastructure remained strong.

Guerilla Warfare is one of patience. By definition it requires the ability to wait out an enemy until they no longer have the resolve to carry on the fight. For a foreign intruder it means waiting until they leave. For a civil victory, it means having the patience to wait until your enemy is weakened in spirit, then consolidate all your efforts in a final military drive to take over.

The Vietnam War was a complicated one and not open to purely military solutions. It was a war where politics, ideology and military warfare were woven into a single pattern. It was a war in which military commanders needed an understanding of political matters to make good decisions and where similarly, politicians needed an understanding of military matters to give effective direction. The need for this dual understanding came from the nature of the war. There were many senior US and allied commanders, civilian and military, whose failure to understand the nature of the war resulted in tragic military mistakes, harmful political direction and dramatically wrong predictions of the progress of the war.

To the troops on the ground all efforts made at the Paris Peace Talks seemed to be favouring North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. When you are in an Army that has, for the most part, secured its objectives and enemy movement is restricted to a point where Australian troops were taking the fight to the NVA and Viet Cong outside of Phuoc Tuy Province and into Long Khanh Province, it was bitter resentment to be told Australia was pulling its troops out of South Vietnam.